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Executive Summary
Despite a $140 billion existing tax break for employer-providedhealth
insurance, tax policy remains the tool of choice for manypolicymakers
in addressing the problem of the uninsured. In this paper,I use a
microsimulation model to estimate the impact of various tax interven-
tions to cover the uninsured, relative to an expansionof public insur-
ance designed to accomplish the samegoals. I contrast the efficiency of
these policies along several dimensions, most notably thedollars of
public spending per dollar of insurance value provided. Ifind that
every tax policy is much lessefficient than public insurance expan-
sions: while public insurance costs the governmentonly between $1.17
and $1.33 per dollar of insurance value provided, tax policies costthe
government between $2.36 and $12.98 per dollar of insurancevalue
provided. I also find that targeting is crucial for efficient taxpolicy; pol-
icies tightly targeted to the lowest income earners have amuch higher
efficiency than do those available higher in the incomedistribution.
Within tax policies, tax credits aimed at employers are the most
efficientand tax credits aimed at employees are the leastefficient
because the single greatest determinant of insurance coverageis
being offered insurance by an employer, and because mostemployees
who are offered such an option already take up that insurance.Tax
credits targeted at non-group coverage are fairly similar toemployer
tax credits at low levels, but they aremuch less efficient at higher
levels.
Federal, state, and local governments in the United Statesintervene
in health insurance markets in a number of ways.Most prominent are
the major public insurance programs for the elderly anddisabled
(Medicare) and for low income groups (Medicaid). In 2004,the40 Gruber
Medicare and Medicaid program each spent about $300 billion. Close
behind is a much less known federal program that spendsover $140
billion per year subsidizing the private purchase of health insurance.
This program is larger than Unemployment Insurance, workers'com-
pensation, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash
welfare program, and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)wage sub-
sidies combined. Yet it is little known and even less understood by the
general public and many politicians.
This program is the tax exclusion of employer-provided health in-
surance expenditures. When employers pay their employees in cash,
that compensation is taxed by federal, state, and sometimes local
income taxes, as well as by federal and state payroll taxes. Yet when
employers pay those same employees in health insurance, thatcom-
pensation is completely untaxed. For a worker in the District of Colum-
bia who faces an income tax rate of 25 percent,a Social Security and
Medicare payroll tax rate (combined employer and employee shares)
of 15.3 percent, and a DC income tax rate of 9.5 percent, this amounts
to an almost 50 percent subsidy to employer-provided health insurance
relative to cash compensation. In total, estimates suggest that these
subsidies total over $140 billion in the United States in 2004.
Despite the large amount that governments in the United States
spend on health care, major access problems remain. Forty-five million
Americans lack health insurance, which results in limitedaccess to
many basic health services and reduced health. For many politicians,
the answer to the access problem is a simple one: further expansion in
the tax subsidization of health insurance.
In this paper, I analyze broadly the possibffities for tax policyas a
means of addressing our health care problems. I begin by discussing
the role of the existing tax exclusion. I then discussa host of additional
tax policies that might be used to increase health insurancecoverage
in the United States, ranging from tax subsidies to the purchase of
health insurance plans by individuals, to targeted tax subsidies for
employers.
To formalize these discussions, I rely on an extensive microsimula-
tion model that has been developed to analyze the implications ofa
wide variety of health insurance reform options. This model incorpo-
rates the best available evidence from the health economics literature
to ifiustrate how individuals, families, and firms respond to changes
in the insurance environment. By incorporating theseresponses, I am
able to compute dynamic estimates of the impact of health insuranceTax Policy for Health Insurance 41
reforms on the distribution of health insurance coverage,government
costs, and private health care burdens.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin, in Part 1,with a detailed de-
scription of existing and proposed tax policiestoward health insur-
ance, and a brief reviewof the relevant literature on their impacts. In
Part 2, I briefly describe the microsimulationmodel that forms the
basis for my analysis. For comparison to later taxpolicy analyses, in
this section I discuss the analysis of a prototypicalexpansion in public
health insurance. Part 3 evaluates a host of alternativesfor increasing
insurance coverage. Part 4 concludes.
1.Background
1.1The Employer Exclusion
As noted in the introduction, the third largesthealth care "program" in
the United States is the exclusion ofemployer-provided health insur-
ance expenditures from taxation.The subsidy to employer-provided
health insurance is generally not well understood.This is not a subsidy
to employers, but rather a subsidy toemployees for insurance pur-
chased in the employment setting. From theemployer's perspective,
whether she pays a worker in wages or health insuranceis irrelevant;
either way, a dollar of employer spending has the sameeffect on the
firm's bottom line (and thus on corporate taxpayments). From the
worker's perspective, however, there is a largedifference: by being
paid in health insurance, rather than wages, theworker is saving taxes.
So if the government wanted to end the taxsubsidy, it would not
involve corporate taxation; rather, the subsidywould be ended by
including employer spending on health insurance as partof taxable
compensation to the individual employee.
This subsidy has been extended not only toemployer spending but
to employee contributions to healthinsurance plans as well. In firms
that have established a Section 125 plan, employeecontributions for
health insurance can be made on a tax-free basis. Thecost of this sub-
sidy is included in the $144 billion estimate notedabove.
For many years, the exclusion ofemployer-provided insurance
from taxation was seen as discriminatorytoward the self-employed.
Beginning in 1986, the health insurance premiumsof the self-employed
were made partiallytax-deductible, and these premiums are now fully
tax deductible. This additional exclusion coststhe government $3.3 bil-
lion per year in foregone tax revenues.42 Gruber
1.2Proposed Tax Policies Toward Health Insurance
Despite the existence of these large subsidies to employer-providedin-
surance, there have been many proposals in recent years to use the tax
code to provide additional subsidies to private insuranceto reduce the
ranks of the uninsured. Most prominentamong these are proposals to
provide individuals with tax credits to purchasenon-group insurance
on their own (not through employers). A typical example of sucha
non-group credit is that proposed by President Bush in his 2004 budget.
The key features of his plan are:
It is fully available to all singles up to $15,000 of (modified)ad-
justed gross income (ACT), and phases out for singles by $30,000of
ACT.
It is fully available to all families up to $30,000 of ACT, and phases
out for families by $60,000 of ACT.
The credit amount is $1,000 for each adult and $500 for eachchild, up
to a maximum of $3,000 per family.
Families can use this credit against up to 90 percent of theirnon-
group insurance costs.
The credit can be used only fornon-group (specifically non-
employer-provided) insurance.
An alternative, or supplement, for non-group creditsare credits for
employees to take up the insurance that theyare offered, or an employee
tax credit. Such tax credits are motivated by the fact thata large share
of the uninsured, roughly one-quarter,are offered health insurance by
their employers but do not take up that offer. The goal ofemployee
tax credits is to subsidize those who are offered insuranceand thus
entice them to take up that offer.
A final alternative for tax policy is to expand the existing subsidyto
employers for their spending on health insurance through employertax
credits. For example, in his campaign for the 2004 democraticpresiden-
tial nomination, Congressman Richard Cephardt proposeda 60 per-
cent credit for the cost of health insurance for all firms, in addition to
their existing tax exclusion. There have also beena large number of
congressional proposals for targeted employer credits to small and/or
low-wage firms.
1.3Efficiency Implications of Tax Policies
Civen the budgetary limitations on any public approachto expand
health insurance coverage, a key concept that drives reform is theTax Policy for Health Insurance 43
efficiency of the policy. There are several different meansof defining
efficiency, which I will review below, but the basic concept isthe extent
to which new public spending is directed tothose who would other-
wise be uninsured, as opposed to "buying out thebase" of existing
insured individuals The issue that is central to all ofthese definitions
is targeting. If individuals were indelibly labeled as"insured" or "unin-
sured," then the government could easily target new taxsubsidies to
those labeled "uninsured," with no spending on thoselabeled "in-
sured." In fact, this is not the case: insurance status is achoice of the
individual and can respond to government policy in a waythat causes
the policy to have lower efficiency.
It is useful to think about the uninsured as tunaand those who
already have insurance as dolphins. The goal of theenvironmentally
conscious fishing industry is to catch as many tuna aspossible in its
nets, while minimizing the number ofdolphins who are caught by
those nets (which happens because tuna and dolphinsswim together
in the ocean). If the uninsured tunas are swimmingin a separate ocean
than are the insured dolphins, the problem isminimized. And if the
uninsured tunas greatly outnumber the insured dolphins,then there is
also a minimal dolphin catch. But, in reality, the 45 millionuninsured
tunas mostly swim in a part of the oceanwhere there are 180 million
insured dolphins, making it difficult if not impossiblefor policymakers
to design insurance nets to capture the tunawithout pulling in the
much more numerous dolphins.
There are three sources of inefficiency with tax credits.The first is
spending on those who already have coverage throughthe subsidized
form of insurance. The group that would benefit mostclearly from
subsidies for non-group insurance, for example, is thosealready hold-
ing non-group insurance. Yet the use of subsidiesby this group does
nothing to reduce the number of the uninsured.
The second is the crowdout of other forms of insurancethrough
subsidizing a particular form of insurance. Forexample, when the
government subsidizes non-group insurance, it canlead those with
group insurance to move to the non-groupmarket, either by their
decision (switching out of employer-provided insurance) orby their
employer's decision (dropping the offering of insurance atthe firm).
This crowdout may or may not lead to inefficiency ingovernment
spending, however. For example, when individualslead employer-
provided insurance for non-group insurance, they increasespending
on new non-group subsidiesbut decrease spending on the existing44 Gruber
exclusion of employer-provided insurance purchases. On net, the rise
in government spending is unclear.
The third source of inefficiency is the possible reduction incoverage
for those who are insured before the policy is put into place. Forexam-
ple, suppose that a firm has a workforce that is predominantly, butnot
universally, eligible for a non-group credit. This firm might decideto
stop offering health insurance because the majority of its employees
can use the credit instead. The minority of employees that cannot use
the credit is then out of luck, however, because they have lost their
employer insurance with no subsidized alternative, and these individ-
uals may become uninsured. This rise in the number of those whoare
uninsured offsets the reductions in the ranks of the existing uninsured,
thus reducing the efficiency of the program by raising spendingper
newly insured person.
Based on this discussion, there are several differentmeans of mea-
suring efficiency. The traditional measure is the "buck for the bang":
dollars of public spending per person newly insured. Anothermea-
sure of interest is the extent of crowdout: the reduction in employer-
provided insurance when other forms of insuranceare subsidized
(or when the existing subsidies to employer-provided insuranceare
reduced). A third measure of interest is the (gross) rise in the unin-
sured due, for example, to firm dropping. A fourthmeasure is the
share of beneficiaries of any intervention who were previously unin-
sured, as opposed to receiving subsidies to remain insured.
A final measure incorporates the type of uninsured whoare affected
by reform. Simply counting the dollars per newly insured is not satis-
factory when different reforms may appeal tovery different popula-
tions. For example, a reform that significantly increases insurance
coverage among children wifi have much lower costs than one that
has the bulk of its effects in the much higher cost adult population. But
this is an unfair comparison because the latter reform is essentially
extending more valuable insurance coverage than is the former. Soa
better measure of efficiency is the spendingper dollar of insurance
value provided, which incorporates both the numerical increases in
coverage and the cost of the individuals who are provided coverage.
2.Microsimulation Modeling
The analysis in this paper relies on microsimulation modeling usinga
model I have developed over the past five years (as first described inTax Policy for Health Insurance 45
Gruber and Levitt, 2000). This microsimulation modelhas several com-
ponents, which I describe in this section.
2.1Data
The data base for this analysis is the February and March2001 Current
Population Survey (CPS). The March survey contains data onfamily
demographic characteristics, income, and health insurance coverage,
while the February survey adds information on employer insurance
offering. Importantly, the March survey also contains data ontaxable
income and marginal tax rates.
These data are matched to information on health insurancepremi-
ums and health costs. Data onthe premiums for employer insurance,
and the distribution of premiums between employersand employees,
comes from the annual Kaiser/HRETnational survey of employers.
These data are matched by state (or state group for small states)and
are assumed to fall with firm size. For non-groupinsurance, a pre-
mium for a healthy 40-year-old male is assigned based onanalyses
from the Community Tracking Survey and theMedical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS), and data on premiums collected by theCom-
monwealth Fund, the Health Insurance Association of America,and
ehealthinsurance.com. This premium is then adjusted by age, sex,and
health status using factors provided by an actuarial consultingfirm.
Finally, data on underlying medical expenditures comesfrom the
MEPS. Total medical expenditures of those withemployer-provided
health insurance are estimated as a function of age, sex,and health
status. These estimates are then reduced by 15 percent toaccount for
administrative costs of private health insurance. The resulting costs are
used in two ways: as a measure of the cost of theindividual if they
were on public insurance; and as a measureof the underlying value of
insurance provision. All cost data in the model hasbeen updated to
2004 dollars.
2.2Modeling Individual Behavior
These data are used to develop a microsimulationmodel that com-
putes the effects of health insurance policies onthe distribution of
health care spending and private and public sector health care costs.
This model takes as inputs both the data sources describedabove and
the detailed parameterization of reform options. Themodel first turns
these policy rules into a set of insurance price changes;for example, if
the policy intervention is a tax credit for non-group insurance,then the46 Gruber
model computes the implied percentage change in the price ofnon-
group insurance for each individual in the model. These prices changes
are then run through a detailed set of behavioral assumptions about
how changes in the absolute and relative price of various types of in-
surance affect individuals, families, and businesses.
The key concept behind this modeling is that the impact of tax
reforms on the price of insurance continuously determines behaviors
such as insurance take-up by the uninsured and insurance offering by
employers. The model assiduously avoids so-called knife-edge behav-
ior, where some critical level is necessary before individuals respond
and beyond which responses are very large. Instead, behavior is mod-
eled as a continuous function of how policy changes (net of tax) insur-
ance prices.
In doing this type of analysis, a number of assumptions must be
made about how individuals wifi respond to tax subsidies, through
their effect on the price of insurance. These assumptions have been
developed based on the available empirical evidence,as reviewed in
detail in Gruber (2002). Some of the key assumptionsare described in
the following subsections.1
2.2.1Take-up of Subsidized Non-group Insurance Among the
UninsuredI calculate take-up of such subsidies by the urinsured by
applying both a price elasticity and a correction for the burden ofpre-
miums relative to income. For the base price elasticity, Iuse 0.625.
I then augment this with a correction factor of the form: [1- (X/
income)]2, where X is the post-subsidynon-group premium for one-
half of the population, and X is the pre-subsidy non-group premium
for one-half of the population. This term accounts for two factors that
are likely to lead to take-up but then fall with income. The first is the
fact that as income falls, individuals are less likely to takeup subsidies
that are less than 100 percent because disposable income is needed for
other expenditures that may be perceived as more urgent (suchas food
and housing). The second is liquidity constraints: insurance expendi-
tures are made throughout the year, but any credits or deductionsare
received the next April. This is a much larger problem for lower in-
come individuals who have both little savings and potentially poor
access to credit markets. I assume that, due to administrative efforts to
address this "advanceability" problem, it arises for only one-half of the
sample.2 The quadratic form of the expression captures the fact that
both of these effects are likely to operatevery strongly toward theTax Policy for Health Insurance 47
bottom of the income distribution. On average, the take-up elasticity
for the uninsured is 0.45 to 0.5.
2.2.2Switching from Group to Non-group PoliciesI assume that
individuals compare their out-of-pocket costs of group insurance with
the subsidized costs of non-group insurance in making their switching
decisions. In particular, switching from group to non-group is a func-
tion of the post-subsidy non-group premium minus the post-subsidy
employee cost of health insurance, divided by the full cost of group in-
surance (the value of the insurance), with an elasticity of 0.33.
2.2.3Price Sensitivity of Employee Take-up of Employer-Provided
Insurance One of the clearest lessons from health economics over the
past decade is that the decision of employees to take up insurance pro-
vided by their employers is not very sensitive to price.4 As a result, for
those with insurance whose employers raise the cost of contributions, I
compute the ratio of changes in employee contributions to insurance
relative to the full price of employer-provided insurance and assume
that there is only a 0.1 elasticity of take-up of employer-provided in-
surance with respect to this ratio. For those without insurance whose
employers lower the cost of employee contributions, I compute the
percentage change in employee contributions and assume an elasticity
of 0.067 for changes of less than 75 percent, and an elasticity that rises
to 0.75 for changes between 75 and 100 percent.
2.3Modeling Firm Behavior
A key aspect of modeling health insurance policy is appropriately
reflecting the decisions of firms because 90 percent of private health
insurance is provided by employers. Economists tend to model firm
decision-making as reflecting the aggregation of worker preferences
within the firm. The exact aggregation function is unclear, as I re-
viewed earlier (Gruber, 2002); in my model, I assume that the mean
incentives for the firm (e.g., the average subsidy rate for non-group in-
surance) is what matters for firm decision-making.
The fundamental problem faced by individual-based microsimula-
tion models is that data on individuals does not reflect the nature of
their co-workers; thus, it is impossible to compute exactly concepts
such as the average non-group subsidy in a worker's firm. I address
this problem by building synthetic firms in the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and assigning each CPS worker a set of co-workers48 Gruber
selected to represent the likely true set of co-workers in that firm. The
core of this computation is data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
that show, for workers of any given earnings level, the earnings distri-
bution of their co-workers separately by firm size, region of the coun-
try, and health insurance offering status. Using these data, I randomly
select 99 individuals in the same firm-size/region/health-insurance-
offering cell as a given CPS worker to replicate statistically the earnings
distribution for that worker's earnings level. These 99 workers then be-
come the co-workers in a worker's synthetic firm.
These synthetic firms then face three decisions about insurance: of-
fering (whether to offer if now not offering, or whether to drop if now
offering); the division of costs between employer and employees; and
the level of insurance spending. I model each of these decisions as sub-
ject to pressures from government interventions, in particular:
Subsidies covering outside insurance options (non-group insurance
or public insurance) exert pressures on firms offering insurance to
drop that insurance and to raise the cost of employee contributions.
Subsidies covering employer spending on insurance cause firms that
don't now offer insurance to be more likely to offer, cause firms to pick
up a larger share of the cost of insurance, and cause a rise in employer
spending on insurance.
Subsidies covering employee spending on insurance also raise the
odds that firms offer insurance and raise employer spending on insur-
ance, but they lower employer contributions to insurance.
Modeling the firm reactions to these pressures involves once again
making a number of assumptions about the behavior of these syn-
thetic firms. Some of the key assumptions are described in the follow-
ing subsections.
2.3.1Firm Offering/DroppingI key firm offering/dropping re-
sponses to the price elasticities of insurance demand for firms esti-
mated in Gruber and Lettau (2004) as follows: 0.69 for firms with
fewer than 100 employees, 0.2 for firms with 100-999 employees,
and 0.1 for firms with more than 1,000 employees. For a firm offering
in response to employer subsidies, I compute the ratio of subsidies to
existing employer spending and apply these elasticities: for a firm
offering in response to employee subsidies, I reduce this by 0.7 to
account for the fact that only about 70 percent of employees take up
insurance; for a firm dropping in response to a non-group subsidy, ITax Policy for Health Insurance 49
compare the extent of the non-group subsidy to the existing tax sub-
sidy to employer insurance: when the non-group subsidy is below the
existing group tax subsidy, I apply only a fraction of the Gruber-Lettau
elasticities, rising from 50 percent to 100 percent to the point where
non-group subsidies and existing tax subsidies are equal;and from
that point on, I simply apply the Gruber-Lettau elasticity.
2.3.2EmployeeContributionsGovernmentsubsidiescovering
spending on employer-provided insurance affects the distribution of
spending across employer and employee. If the subsidy goes to the
employer, I assume that 30 cents of each dollar of subsidy is spent in
buying back employee contributions.5 Likewise, if the subsidy goes to
the employee, I assume that employers raise employee contributions
to offset 70 cents of each dollar of (average across the firm) subsidies to
employees. When a subsidy covers non-group insurance, I assume that
the firm raises employee contributions by 15 percent of the subsidy
rate to encourage non-group insurance take-up.
2.3.3Employer SpendingIf the government offers an open-ended
percentage credit, I assume an elasticity of spending with respect to
the credit amount of 50 percent, but if there is a flat dollar credit, I
assume that only 20 cents of each dollar goes to higherspending. For
employee credits, spending reacts in the same way, but it is scaled
down by 0.7.
Finally, a key assumption for this type of modeling is the assump-
tion on the wage incidence of changes in employer insurance spending.
In earlier work (Gruber, 2001), I reviewed the literature on incidence
and concluded that there is strong evidence for full shifting to wages
of firm-wide changes in insurance costs, with some evidence of shifting
to sub-groups within the workplace as well. I make a mixed incidence
assumption for this model. Any firm-wide reaction, such as dropping
insurance or lowering employee contributions, is directly reflected in
wages. Yet any individual's decision, such as switchingfrom group to
non-group insurance, is not reflected in that individual's wages; rather,
the savings to the firm (or the cost to the firm) is passed along, on aver-
age, to all workers in the firm.
2.4 An Example: Expanding Public Health Insurance
It is difficult to interpret the results for tax policy that come from this
model without some baseline, so in this section I illustrate the results50 Gruber
from this model for two examples of expansions in our existing safety
net of public insurance programs. The first example is the introduction
of free public health insurance for all persons in the United States with
income below 100 percent of the poverty line; in this range, children
and many parents are already eligible for public insurance, but single
adults and most parents are not. The second is the introduction of pub-
lic health insurance for all persons in the United States with income
below 225 percent of the poverty line; once again, most children in the
United States are eligible for much of this range, but most adults are
not.
The effects of these three policies on health insurance coverage, costs,
and the income distribution are summarized in Table 1, which presents
some key outputs from these model runs. The first row shows the
number of uninsured persons who take up the Medicaid expansions,
which is 3.13 million persons for the 100 percent expansion, and 8.75
million persons for the 225 percent expansion. The next row shows a
Table 1
Public Insurance Expansions as a Benchmark
Changes in population
(millions of persons)
Uninsured takeup 3.13 8.75
Uninsured share of takeup (%) 85.1% 69.6%
Uninsured increase 0.07 0.82
Net decrease in uninsured 3.06 7.93
Net change in employer insured 0.31 3.88
Net change in non-group insured 0.34 1.19
Net change in publicly insured 3.68 12.57
Costs ($2004 billions)
Total cost per year $11,350 $28,670
Cost per newly insured ($) $3,707 $3,615
Targeting
Average age of newly insured 37.5 36.3
Percentage of newly insured in 21.3 15.5
fair/poor health
Average cost of newly insured $3,154 $2,673
Spending per dollar of insurance $1.17 $1.33
provided
Expand to 100% Expand to 225%
Policy of poverty of povertyTax Policy for Health Insurance 51
first measure of policy targeting: the percentage of individuals taking
up public insurance who were formerly uninsured. For the 100 percent
expansion, 85 percent of those taking up public insurance were for-
merly uninsured, and only 15 percent were leaving other forms of in-
surance to join public insurance. For the 225 percent expansion, 70
percent of those taking up public insurance were formerly uninsured.
As we wifi see below, these are incredibly well-targeted policies.
The next row shows the rise in the number of uninsured that occurs
through one of two channels: individuals who lose insurance when
their firms stop offering, or individuals who drop employer-provided
insurance when the cost of contributions rise in response to the public
insurance expansion (the majority of this total is accounted for by the
former group). This number is very modest for the 100 percent expan-
sion, 0.07 miffion, but it is more sizeable for the 225 percent expansion,
0.82 million. The next row shows the net change in uninsured, approx-
imately 3 miffion and 8 million, respectively.
The remaining rows in the first panel show the change in the size of
other insurance groups from this policy. There is a small reduction in
the number of employer insured from the expansion to 100 percent as
those with employer insurance switch to public insurance (since it is
free) and some employers stop offering employer insurance. There is
also a small migration from non-group insurance to public insurance.
When eligibifity is expanded to 225 percent of poverty, there is a much
larger reduction in the number of employer insured (almost 4 million)
and non-group insured (over 1 million).
The total cost of these policies is shown in the next panel. The expan-
sion to 100 percent of the poverty level costs almost $11.4 billion per
year, while the expansion to 225 percent costs almost $29 billion. Both
policies have a comparable cost per person who is newly insured of
roughly $3,700.
The next panel of the table focuses on the targeting of the policy, in
terms of which types of formerly uninsured individuals are helped by
this intervention. For these expansions, the average age of the unin-
sured person who gains insurance is roughly 37 years; 15-20 percent
are in fair or poor health, and 18-20 percent are in excellent health. For
comparison, among all uninsured persons, the average age is 30 years;
9 percent are in fair or poor health, and 29 percent are in excellent
health. Thus, the set of individuals now covered by these expansions is
in much worse health, and it is therefore more costly to insure, than is
the set of uninsured individuals not affected by the policy.52 Gruber
This point is summarized by the next row in the table, which shows
the average cost associated with insuring the uninsured who gain cov-
erage through these initiatives. For this calculation, I have imputed
to each person in the data the cost of insuring them through public
insurance (which is roughly 15 percent below the cost of private insur-
ance) as a measure of the true insurance cost. For all uninsured per-
sons, this average cost is $2,100; for those gaining insurance through
these expansions, the cost is 25-50 percent higher, at $2,700$3,200.
The last row of Table 1 shows government spending per dollar of in-
surance value provided, which is the ratio of government spending to
the sum of the insurance value provided to the uninsured. This figure
is $1.17 for the expansion to 100 percent of the poverty level, indicating
that for each dollar of insurance that the government is providing, it is
spending $1.17. Thus, roughly speaking, the deadweight loss of this
approach to providing insurance, relative to an ideal that gave insur-
ance only to those who were otherwise uninsured, is 17 cents. This
small deadweight loss arises from the small amount of substitution
from other forms of insurance into public insurance that accompanies
the reduction in the uninsured. For the larger expansion, the ineffi-
ciency rises somewhat, to 33 cents.
3.Alternative Expansions of Tax Subsidies
In this section, I consider the implications of alternative types of expan-
sions of the tax code to increase insurance coverage. To make our
results comparable to the runs shown earlier for public insurance, I
have chosen tax policy parameters designed to meet two goals: reduce
the number of uninsured by 3 million persons, and reduce the number
of uninsured by 8 million persons. The cost per person covered from
these policies typically falls as the number of persons covered rises, so
it is important to compare these policies on a comparable basis.
One overall note of importance: for all of the analysis considered
here, I assume that any tax policies are fully refundable. Roughly half
of the uninsured do not pay taxes, so any non-refundable tax policy
wifi have very limited impact.
3.1Non-group Credits
I begin with non-group tax credits of a simple form. Individuals and
families are eligible for a credit of one size for single coverage and a
credit of another size for family coverage. This eligibility is restrictedTax Policy for Health Insurance 53
on income in one of two ways. First, I consider a tightlytargeted non-
group credit that is fully available to single persons with incomebelow
$15,000, or families with income below $30,000, and that phases out as
income rises, with eligibility ending at $30,000 for singles and $60,000
for families. Second, I consider a loosely targeted non-group credit
that is fully available to single persons with income below $25,000, or
families with income below $50,000, and that phases out as income
rises, with eligibility ending at $50,000 for singles and $100,000 for
families. Given these income restrictions, the value of the tax credit is
then set to hit the targets of 3 million and 8 million reduction in the
uninsured.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. Several differences
from Table 1 are immediately apparent. First, there is a much larger
Table 2
Non-group Credits
Targeting Tight (15-30 K/30-60 K)Loose (25-50 K/50-100 K)
Target 3 million 8 million 3 million 8 million
Credit amount $1,460! $4,750! $1,685! $4,350!
$3,650 $11,875 $4,210 $10,875
Changes in population (millions of persons)
Uninsured takeup 5.08 12.38 7.88 15.08
Uninsured share of takeup (%)37.4% 45.0% 34.0% 36.2%
Uninsured increase 2.08 4.37 4.88 7.07
Net decrease in uninsured 3.00 8.01 3.00 8.01
Net change in employer
insured
-5.29 -13.50 -13.16 -25.97
Net change in non-group
insured
8.69 22.57 16.42 34.85
Net change in publicly
insured
-0.40 -1.06 -0.26 -0.87
Costs ($2004 billions)
Total cost $11,222 $56,458 $21,468 $85,065
Cost per newly insured ($) $3,741 $7,048 $7,157 $10,619
Targeting
Average age of formerly
uninsured
25.6 27.4 26.2 27.9
Percentage newly insured in
fair/poor health
2.3 4.0 2.4 3.8
Average cost of newly insured $1,481 $1,675 $1,488 $1,668
Spending per $ of insurance $3.24 $4.63 $9.26 $7.5054 Gruber
gross increase in the uninsured, which offsets the gross reduction in
meeting our targets of 3 and 8 million. For example, to hit the target of
an 8 million person reduction with tight targeting requires take-up by
12.4 million persons because there is a 4.4 million person rise in the
uninsured after firms drop insurance. Second, there are very large
reductions in the number of employer insured due both to employee
switching and firms dropping insurance; roughly 20 percent of this
reduction comes from switching, and the remaining 80 percent is due
to firm dropping. Morever, a much smaller share of the recipients, be-
tween 34 and 45 percent, were previously uninsured; the majority are
using this subsidy while retaining insurance coverage.
This may seem like a lot of firms dropping insurance in response to
(in particular in the first column) fairly small non-group credits, but it
is important to remember that this reduction in employer insured is
from a very large base of over 160 million employer-insured. The 5.29
million reduction in employer-insured in the first column, for example,
represents just over 3 percent of the employer-insured in the United
States. Even with the enormous non-group credit shown in the second
column, $4,750 for singles and $11,875 for families, only 8.2 percent of
those with employer-provided insurance drop that insurance. This is
partly because the credits are targeted to only a subset of employees
so that, on average, the pressure on employers to stop offering in-
surance (due to the erosion of the employer tax advantage) is small.
When the credit is more loosely targeted, in the final two columns, the
reduction in the employer-insured is much larger, rising to almost 16
percent of the employer-insured in the final column.
Third, this approach is by and large more expensive than public
expansions. For the 3 million target, with the tightly targeted credit,
the cost is very similar to the public expansion. The other approaches,
however, are much more expensive, both overall and (by definition)
per person newly insured. Indeed, a loosely targeted credit designed
to cover 8 million persons costs over $85 billion per year, or more than
$10,000 per person newly insured.
Another striking difference between public expansions and non-
group credits is the targeting of the spending. In contrast to public
expansions, the set of uninsured who gain coverage through non-
group credits is much healthier than the average uninsured person,
with an average age of 25-28 years and only 2-4 percent in fair or
poor health. The average cost of insuring the newly insured is only
$1,500$1,800 per year.Tax Policy for Health Insurance 55
The reason for these low costs is that these types of partial subsidies
to non-group insurance are much more attractive to the healthy indi-
viduals, for whom the lower cost of non-group insurance makes these
subsidies a larger percentage. As a result, the value of insurance pro-
vided by these policies is much less than it is for a public expansion.
Indeed, as the last row shows, it takes more than $3 to almost $10 of
government spending to provide just $1 of insurance coverage through
these policies. Thus, by this measure, non-group tax credits are much
less efficient than are public insurance expansions.
A clear lesson from this analysis is that the efficiency of non-group
credits is much higher if they are tightly rather than loosely targeted.
Given the low incomes of the uninsured, focusing credits on the lowest
income groups in society leads a higher share of the expenditures to be
directed towards those who would be otherwise uninsured. This high-
lights the value of tightly targeting health care interventions, but it is
not clear how politically realistic such targeting will be given the broad
reach of recent tax policy changes.
3.2Employee Credits
Another tax policy alternative that has received substantial attention
is the use of tax credits to offset the costs to employees of purchasing
their employer-provided health insurance. The motivation for these
credits is the "low hanging fruit" of the large number of uninsured
who are already offered employer-provided health insurance. Because
these individuals are in an arena where it is easy to obtain health insur-
ance, the reasoning goes, and because employers already pay the ma-
jority of insurance costs, it should be relatively cheap to subsidize the
cost of these uninsured taking up insurance.
There are three problems with this argument, however. First, if
employee contributions become tax-subsidized by the government,
then employers have an incentive to shift the costs of insurance to
employeesor at least they no longer have a disincentive to do so.
As noted earlier, Gruber and McKnight (2003) find a substantial nega-
tive response of employee contributions to the tax subsidy covering
employer-provided insurance; presumably, tax subsidies covering em-
ployee contributions would have the opposite effect. Second, this is
a very poorly targeted policy: the vast majority of those offered
employer-provided health insurance take up that insurance. Indeed, of
those offered employer-provided insurance, only about 7 percent
are uninsured; even among the population below the poverty line, 75percent of those offered insurance are insured. Finally, as noted above,
a sizeable literature now documents the fact that the decision to take
up employer-provided insurance, if offered, is not price sensitive.
Table 3 shows the results of running several employee tax credit
policies through my microsimulation model. Once again, this table
considers tightly and loosely targeted credits, with the same income
cutoffs as for non-group insurance: targeted to hit 3 million and 8 mil-
lion person reductions in the uninsured. Along some dimensions, em-
ployee tax credits look more attractive than non-group credits. There
is only a small rise in, the number of uninsured, which offsets the take-
up by the previously insured; this small increase comes from individu-
als leaving their employer-provided insurance because the firm has
raised the cost of contributions, but they are not one of the subsidized




Targeting Tight (15-30 K/30-60 K)Loose (25-50 K/SO-lOU K)
Target 3 million 8 million 3 million 8 million
Credit amount $800! $3,600! $610! $2,000!
$2,000 $9,000 $1,525 $5,000
Changes in population (millions of persons)
Uninsured takeup 3.47 9.21 3.55 9.29
Uninsured share of takeup (%) 5.8% 13.0% 3.5% 8.1%
Uninsured increase 0.47 1.22 0.54 1.27
Net decrease in uninsured 3.00 7.99 3.01 8.02
Net change in employer
insured
5.45 13.64 5.53 13.95
Net change in non-group
insured
-0.74 -2.07 -0.86 -2.43
Net change in publicly
insured
-1.7 -3.57 -1.66 -3.50
Costs ($2004 billions)
Total cost $35,153 $177,460 $58,671 $209,077
Cost per newly insured ($) $11,707 $22,198 $19,501 $26,073
Targeting
Average age of newly insured 27.6 28.5 27.6 28.7
Percentage of newly insured
in fair/poor health
8.5 8.5 7.5 8.0
Average cost of newly insured$1,986 $2,005 $1,944 $1,981
Spending per $ of insurance $5.82 $10.92 $9.91 $12.98Tax Policy for Health Insurance 57
insurance. Finally, as the last panel shows, these policies are somewhat
better targeted to the uninsured in poor health than are non-group
credits, although the targeting is still much less than with public insur-
ance expansions.
Employee credits perform much worse, however, on one key dimen-
sion: cost. To cover 3 million persons with a tightly targeted employee
tax credit would cost over $35 billion per year, a cost of almost $12,000
per newly insured; if the targeting is looser, the cost rises to almost
$20,000 per newly insured. These higher costs arise because there is
enormous expenditure on the vast majority of those who already have
insurance, so this is simply a subsidy to existing behavior: in most
cases, fewer than 10 percent of those using this subsidy were previ-
ously uninsured. As the final row of Table 3 shows, the government
would spend between $6 and $13 per dollar of insurance provided if it
pursued these types of policies.
Thus, while employee tax credits create much less disruption in
insurance markets than do non-group credits, employer-insured in-
dividuals can take them without changing their existing insurance
arrangements. These tax credits cost much more because so much of
the spending is an inframarginal subsidy to those who already have
employer-provided insurance. Indeed, only about 10 percent of the
individuals taking advantage of this credit were previously uninsured.
3.3Employer Credits
The final type of tax credit that I consider is credits paid to employers
offering insurance to their employees. Once again, the parameters of
these tax policies are chosen to hit targets of 3 and 8 million person
reductions in the uninsured, and once again there is more tightly and
more loosely targeted versions of these policies. The more loosely tar-
geted version is credits that are provided to all employers with fewer
than 50 employees. While typical of many proposals to subsidize
employer-provided coverage, this type of subsidy structure has two
disadvantages. First, the majority of firms with fewer than 50 employ-
ees still offer health insurance: non-offering is concentrated in the very
smallest firms, and in those firms with the lowest-wage jobs. Second, a
cutoff, or a so-called cliff, at 50 employees can provide disincentives for
firms to grow beyond the critical 50 employee level.
To address these concerns, a more tightly targeted version of
these credits would make three changes: focus the subsidy dollars on







20-30 K average earnings)Loose (<50 employees)
Changes in population (millions of persons)
employees, and phase out the subsidy as both firm size and wages rise
to avoid cliffs. In my more tightly targeted version of these employer
credits, phase out starts at a firm size of 25 (and ends at a firm size of
50), and credits are provided in full only to firms with average earn-
ings below $20,000 and are phased out by firm average earnings of
$30,000 (the average for small firms).
The results for these more tightly and loosely targeted credit ver-
sions are presented in Table 4. The first noticeable implication of this
approach is that the gross and net change in the number of uninsured
are identical: there is no crowdout with subsidies to employers. Never-
theless, once again, a sizeable share of the dollars are delivered to those
who already have health insurance; as the final row of the second
panel shows, only between 9 and 35 percent of the subsidy recipients
were formerly uninsured.
3 million 8 million 3 million8 million
$1,050! $3,100! $700! $2,370!
$2,625 $7,750 $1,750 $5,925
Uninsured takeup 3.00
Uninsured share of takeup (%) 20.2%
Uninsured increase 0
Net decrease in uninsured 3.00
Net change in employer insured 4.65
Net change in non-.group -1.03
insured
Net change in publicly insured -0.62
Total cost $14,078
Cost per newly insured ($) $4,685
Average age of newly insured 35.0
Percentage of newly insured in 8.6
fair!poor health
Average cost of newly insured $1,986















$3.70 $3.57 $5.47Tax Policy for Health Insurance 59
In terms of total costs, and therefore costs per newly insured, the
employer credit is comparable to the non-group credit, and both re-
main much less costly than the employee credit. One striking difference
between the non-group credit and the employer credit, however, is
that the employer credit covers a substantially higher cost population.
The average cost of the individuals gaining insurance is around $2,000
for the employer tax credits, while the average cost is around $1,500 for
the non-group tax credits. As a result, government spending per dollar
of insurance delivered is much lower for the employer credit than for
the non-group credit.
Table 4 once again highlights the important role of targeting. The
tight employer credit is fairly well targeted, at least relative to other
tax policies, with 20-35 percent of the benefits going to the uninsured.
The loose employer credit, however, is very poorly targeted because
the majority of those in firms with less than 50 employees already
have health insurance, so that only 9-18 percent of the benefits go to
the uninsured.
3.4Comparison
Table 5 provides a comparison of these various policy options, along
the various measures of efficiency noted earlier:
Induced increase in the number of uninsured.
Change in employer-insured.
Dollars of spending per newly insured.
Percentage of beneficiaries formerly uninsured.
Average cost of those gaining insurance.
Dollars of spending per dollar of insurance provided.
The best measure of efficiency of government spending is the last
item in the list. It is immediately clear that expanding public insurance
vastly outperforms tax policy along this dimension. The most efficient
tax policies along this dimension spend three times as much per dollar
of insurance provided as do public expansions.
Within tax policies, several lessons are apparent. First, employer tax
credits are the most efficient outcome, followed fairly closely by non-
group credits, with employee tax credits clearly the worst.Second,
tightly targeted tax credits are much more efficient than are loosely
targeted tax credits, particularly for non-group insurance. Third, effi-
ciency almost universally declines as the size of the credit grows






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Tax Policy for Health Insurance 61
credits become more attractive to the insured. Thus, one cannot com-
pare directly two policies that cover verydifferent numbers of persons
because the policy covering more persons will be less efficient. Fourth,
the efficiency of any policy is determined by several interactivefactors:
the size of the credit required to achieve the targeted reduction in
the number of uninsured, the share of benefits going to the un-
insured, and the targeting of the benefits in terms of the health of the
uninsured.
For example, compare the tight non-group and tight employercred-
its that cover 3 miffion persons. In this case, the size of thecredit is
about 50 percent bigger for non-group credits, the share of recipients
previously uninsured is almost twice as large for non-group credits,
but the recipients are much healthier for non-group credits. As a result,
on net, employer credits are more efficient.As another example, com-
pare employee to employer credits. Thesecredits are similar in terms
of the size of the credit and the average health of the formerly unin-
sured recipients, but employer credits deliver a much larger share of
benefits to the formerly uninsured.
From Table 5, we can outline the weaknesses of each tax policy rela-
tive to each other, and relative to the benchmark of a public insurance
expansion. Non-group credits have the highest share of recipients who
are formerly uninsured; for loosely targetedcredits, this share is much
higher than it is for either employee or employer credits. Yet they are
much less efficient than employer credits because the uninsured who
take the credits are much healthier and because a much larger credit is
required to achieve the net reduction in the number of uninsured. This
larger credit is required, in turn, because the non-group credits cause
the largest increase in the number of unuinsured. Thus, there is a vicious
cycle with non-group credits; to cover many uninsured people requires
a larger credit, but the larger the credit, the morethe erosion of the
employer market and the larger gross rise in the number of uninsured
that must be offset by uninsured take-up of the non-group credit.
Employer credits feature a small required credit amount, and the
uninsured who take up coverage are of average health. But these cred-
its deliver a relatively small share of their benefits to the formerly unin-
sured, particularly if the credit is loosely targeted. The least attractive
option, from an efficiency perspective, is credits to employees because
such a very small share of benefits accrue to the formerly uninsured,
particularly for loosely targeted employee credits.62 Gruber
Conclusion
It is clear from the analysis in this paper that if the goal is to cover 3-8
million uninsured persons, expanding public insurance is a more effi-
cient option than any tax policy considered so far. Despite this fact, tax
policy will continue to be the avenue of choice for expanding health in-
surance coverage in the United States for politicians of many stripes.
Thus, it is critical to understand the strengths and weaknesses of alter-
native tax policy approaches.
Several lessons for tax policy are clear from this analysis. First, and
probably most important, regardless of which tax policy option iscon-
sidered, targeting is key: tightly targeted tax policies dramatically out-
perform loosely targeted policies in terms of efficiency. This conclusion
is important to emphasize because targeting comes with political costs;
it is much more politically expedient to allow a larger group of individ-
uals to benefit from a policy than to restrict those benefits toa smaller
(low-income group). Yet widening the income range of tax policies
comes at great cost in terms of their effectiveness.
Second, one cannot compare directly two policies that cover very
different numbers of uninsured because the efficiency of any tax policy
falls as its scope increases. Finally, what matters for the efficiency of tax
policy is not only the targeting of benefits in terms of the share of indi-
viduals who are uninsured, but also which individuals are covered.
Providing coverage to very young and healthy individuals provides
less insurance value per dollar of spending than does providing cover-
age to higher cost groups.
Notes
I am grateful to Charles Stoecker and William Lincoln for excellent research assistance,
and to Jim Poterba and conference participants for helpful comments.
There is obviously variation in the possible assumptions that could be made here. See
Remler et al. (2002) for a broad review of the assumptions made in microsimulation
models such as these.
This assumption may be generous given that the government's only existing experi-
ence with advanceabifity, advance claiming of the earned income tax credit, has only a 1
percent take-up rate.
At the average income correction factor in our sample of the uninsured, this produces
an elasticity of 0.5. This estimate is lower than that of Gruber and Poterba (1994), who
suggest elasticities of 1 or greater (in absolute value). The upper bound elasticity is sim-Tax Policy for Health Insurance 63
ilar to recent estimates by Royalty (2000). The average elasticity is somewhat higher than
the range of 0.33 to 0.4 presented in Marquis and Long (1995).
See Gruber and Washington (forthcoming) for a review of the literature on this point
and additional evidence.
Gruber and McKnight (2003) estimate an elasticity of employee contributions with
respect to the tax price of employer-provided insurance of 0.3.
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